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Abstract— Voice over IP (VoIP) and Internet Multimedia
Subsystem (IMS) technologies are rapidly being adopted by
consumers, enterprises, governments and militaries. These tech-
nologies offer higher flexibility and more features than traditional
telephony (PSTN) infrastructures, as well as the potential for
lower cost through equipment consolidation and, for the con-
sumer market, new business models. However, VoIP/IMS systems
also represent a higher complexity in terms of architecture,
protocols and implementation, with a corresponding increase
in the potential for misuse. Here, we begin to examine the
current state of affairs on VoIP/IMS security through a sur-
vey of known/disclosed security vulnerabilities in bug-tracking
databases. This paper should serve as a starting point for
understanding the threats and risks in a rapidly evolving set of
technologies that are seeing increasing deployment and use. Our
goal is to gain a better understanding of the security landscape
with respect to VoIP/IMS, toward directing future research in
this and other similar emerging technologies.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rate at which new technologies are being introduced
and adopted by society has been steadily accelerating through-
out human history. The advent of pervasive computing and
telecommunications has reinforced this trend. In this envi-
ronment of constant innovation, individuals, governments and
organizations have been struggling to manage the tension
between reaping the benefits of new technologies while un-
derstanding and managing their risks. In this struggle, cost
reductions, convenience and new features typically overcome
security concerns. As a result, security experts (but also the
government and the courts of law) are often left with the task
of playing “catch up” with those who exploit flaws to further
their own goals. This is the situation we find ourselves in
with respect to one popular class of technologies, collectively
referred to as Voice over IP (VoIP).
VoIP, sometimes also referred to as Internet Multimedia
Subsystem (IMS), refers to a class of products that enable
advanced communication services over data networks. While
voice is a key aspect in such products, video and other
capabilities (e.g., collaborative editing and whiteboard sharing,
file sharing, calendaring) are supported. The key advantages
of VoIP/IMS are flexibility and low cost. The former derives
from the (generally) open architectures and software-based
implementation, while the latter is due to new business models,
equipment and network-link consolidation, and ubiquitous
consumer-grade broadband connectivity.
Due to these benefits, VoIP has seen rapid uptake in both
the enterprise and consumer markets. An increasing number
of enterprises are replacing their internal phone switches with
VoIP-based implementations, both to introduce new features
and to eliminate redundant equipment. Consumers have em-
braced a slew of technologies with different features and costs,
including P2P calling, Internet-to-phone network bridging, and
wireless VoIP. These new technologies and business models
are being promoted by a new generation of startup companies
that are challenging the traditional status quo in telephony and
personal telecommunications. As a result, a number of PSTN
providers have already completed or are in the process of
transitioning from circuit-switched networks to VoIP-friendly
packet-switched backbones. Finally, as the commercial and
consumer sectors go, so do governments and militaries due
to cost reduction concerns and the general dependence on
Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) equipment for the majority
of their computing needs.
However, higher complexity is often the price we pay for
more flexibility. In the case of VoIP/IMS technologies, a
number of factors contribute to architectural, protocol, imple-
mentation and operational complexity:
• The number and complexity of the various features inte-
grated in a product are perhaps the single largest source
of complexity. For example, voice and video transmission
typically allow for a variety of codecs which may be used
in almost-arbitrary combinations. Since one of the biggest
selling points for VoIP/IMS is feature-richness and the
desire to unify personal communications under the same
umbrella, this is a particularly pertinent concern.
• Openness and modularity, generally considered desirable
traits, allow for a number of independent implementations
and products. Each of these comes with its own param-
eters and design choices. Interoperability concerns and
customer feedback then lead to an ever-growing baseline
of supported features for all products. A compounding
factor to increasing complexity for many of the open VoIP
protocols is the “design-by-committee” syndrome, which
typically leads to larger, more inclusive specifications
than would otherwise be the case (e.g., in a closed,
proprietary environment such as the wireline telephony
network from 20 years ago).
• Because VoIP systems are envisioned to operate in a
variety of environments, business settings, and network
conditions, they must offer considerable configurability,
which in turns leads to high complexity. Of particular
concern are unforeseen feature interactions and other
emergent properties.
• Finally, VoIP are generally meant to work over a public
data network (e.g., the Internet), or an enterprise/operator
network that uses the same underlying technology. As a
result, there is a substantial amount of (strictly speaking)
non-VoIP infrastructure that is critical for the correct
operation of the system, including such protocols/services
as DHCP [1], DNS [2], [3], TFTP/BOOTP [4], [5], NAT
[6] (and NAT traversal protocols such as STUN [7]),
NTP [8], SNMP [9], routing, the web (HTTP [10], [11],
TLS/SSL [12], etc.) and many others. As we shall see,
even a “perfectly secure” VoIP system can be compro-
mised by subverting elements of this infrastructure.
Because of this complexity, which manifests itself both in
terms of configuration options and size of the code base for
VoIP implementations, VoIP systems represent a very large at-
tack surface. Thus, one should expect to encounter, over time,
security problems arising from design flaws (e.g., exploitable
protocol weaknesses), undesirable feature interactions (e.g.,
combinations of components that make new attacks possible or
existing/known attacks easier), unforeseen dependencies (e.g.,
compromise paths through seemingly unrelated protocols),
weak configurations, and, not least, implementation flaws.
In this paper, we attempt a first effort at mapping out the
space of VoIP threats and risks by conducting a survey of
the “actually seen” vulnerabilities and attacks, as reported
by the popular press and by bug-tracking databases. Our
work is by necessity of evolutionary nature, and this paper
represents a current (and limited) snapshot of the complete
space. Nonetheless, we believe that it will serve as a valuable
starting point for understanding the bigger problem, and as a
basis for a more comprehensive analysis in the future.
Paper Organization: The remainder of this paper is
organized as follows. Section II contains a brief overview
of two major VoIP technologies, SIP and UMA. While we
refer to other VoIP/IMS systems throughout the discussion,
we focus on the specific two technologies as they are both
representative, widely used, and well-documented. We discuss
VoIP threats in Section III, placing known attacks against VoIP
systems within the taxonomy proposed by the VoIP Security
Alliance1. We analyze our findings in Section IV, and conclude
with some preliminary thoughts on the current state of VoIP
security, and on possible future directions for security research
and practices in Section V.
II. VOIP TECHNOLOGIES OVERVIEW
In their simplest form, Voice over IP protocols simply
enable two (or more) devices to transmit and receive real-time
audio traffic that allows their respective users to communicate.
In general, VoIP architectures are partitioned in two main
components: signaling and media transfer. Signaling covers
both abstract notions, such as endpoint naming and addressing,
and concrete protocol functions such as parameter negoti-
ation, access control, billing, proxying, and NAT traversal.
Depending on the architecture, quality of service (QoS) and
device configuration/management may also be part of the
signaling protocol (or protocol family). The media transfer
1http://www.voipsa.org/
aspect of VoIP systems generally includes a comparatively
simpler protocol for encapsulating data, with support for
multiple codecs and (often, but not always) content security.
A commonly used media transfer protocol is RTP [13], with
a version supporting encryption and integrity (SRTP [14])
defined but not yet widely used. The RTP protocol family
also includes RTCP, which is used to control certain RTP
parameters between communicating endpoints.
However, a variety of other features are generally also
desired by users and offered by providers as a means for differ-
entiation by competing technologies and services, such video,
integration with calendaring and file sharing, and bridging to
other networks (e.g., to the “regular” telephony network). Fur-
thermore, a number of different decisions may be made when
designing a VoIP system, reflecting different requirements and
approaches to addressing, billing, mobility, security and access
control, usability, and other issues. Consequently, there exist a
variety of different VoIP/IMS protocols and architectures. For
concreteness, we will focus our attention on a popular and
widely deployed technology: the Session Initiation Protocol
(SIP) [15]. We will also discuss the Unlicensed Mobile Access
(UMA) architecture [16], as a different approach to VoIP that
is gaining traction among wireless telephony operators. In the
rest of this section, we give a high-level overview of SIP and
UMA, followed by a brief description of the salient points of
a few other popular VoIP systems, such as H.323 and Skype.
We will refer back to this overview when discussing the threat
space and specific vulnerabilities in Section III.
A. Session Initiation Protocol
SIP is a protocol standardized by the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), and is designed to support the setup
of bidirectional communication sessions including, but not
limited to, VoIP calls. It is similar in some ways to HTTP, in
that it is text-based, has a request-response structure, and even
uses a mechanism based on the HTTP Digest Authentication
[17] for user authentication. However, it is an inherently state-
ful protocol that supports interaction with multiple network
components (e.g., middleboxes such as PSTN bridges). While
its finite state machine is seemingly simple, in practice it
has become quite large and complicated — an observation
supported by the fact that the main SIP RFC [15] is one of
the longest ever defined.
SIP can operate over a number of transport protocols,
including TCP [18], UDP [19] and SCTP [20]. UDP is gener-
ally the preferred method due to simplicity and performance,
although TCP has the advantage of supporting TLS protection
of call setup. However, recent work on Datagram TLS (DTLS)
[21] may render this irrelevant. SCTP, on the other hand,
offers several advantages over both TCP and UDP, including
DoS resistance [22], multi-homing and mobility support, and
logical connection multiplexing over a single channel.
In the SIP architecture, the main entities are end points
(whether softphones or physical devices), a proxy server, a
registrar, a redirect server, and a location server. Figure 1



















Fig. 1. Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) entity interactions. User Alice registers with her domain’s Registrar (1), which stores the information in the Location
Server (2). When placing a call, Alice contacts her local Proxy Server (3), which may consult the Location Server (4). A call may be forwarded to another
Proxy Server (5), which will consult its domain Location Server (6) before forwarding the call to the final recipient. After the SIP negotiation terminates,
RTP is used directly between Alice and Bob to transfer media content. For simplicity, this diagram does not show the possible interaction between Alice and
a Redirection Server (which would, in turn, interact with the Location Server).
registrar, proxy and redirect servers may be combined, or they
may be separate entities operated independently. Endpoints
communicate with a registrar to indicate their presence. This
information is stored in the location server. A user may be
registered via multiple endpoints simultaneously.
During call setup, the endpoint communicates with the
proxy which uses the location server to determine where the
call should be routed to. This may be another endpoint in the
same network (e.g., within the same enterprise), or another
proxy server in another network. Alternatively, endpoints may
use a redirect server to directly determine where a call should
be directed to; redirect servers consult with the location server
in the same way that proxy servers operate during call setup.
Once an end-to-end channel has been established (through one
or more proxies) between the two endpoints, SIP negotiates
the actual session parameters (such as the codecs, RTP ports,
etc.) using the Session Description Protocol (SDP) [23].
Figure 2 shows the message exchanges during a two-party
call setup. Alice sends an INVITE message to the proxy server,
optionally containing session parameter information encoded
within SDP. The proxy forwards this message directly to Bob,
if Alice and Bob are users of the same domain. If Bob is
registered in a different domain, the message will be relayed
to Bob’s proxy, and from there to Bob. Note that the message
may be forwarded to multiple endpoints, if bob is registered
from multiple locations. While these are ringing (or otherwise
indicating that a call setup is being requested), RINGING
messages are sent back to Alice. Once the call has been
accepted, an OK message is sent to Alice, containing his
preferred parameters encoded within SDP. Alice responds with
an ACK message. Alice’s session parameter preferences may
be encoded in the INVITE or the ACK message.
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Fig. 2. Message exchanges during a SIP-based two-party call setup.
mitting voice, video or other content (as negotiated) using the
agreed-upon media transport protocol, typically RTP. While
the signaling traffic may be relayed through a number of SIP
proxies, the media traffic is exchanged directly between the
two endpoints. When bridging different networks, e.g., PSTN
and SIP, media gateways may disrupt the end-to-end nature
of the media transfer. These entities translate content (e.g.,
audio) between the formats that are supported by the different
networks.
Because signaling and media transfer operate independent





















    realm="D1", nonce="12cc9a63"
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Fig. 3. SIP Digest Authentication
the proxies that the call has been terminated, using a BYE
message which is relayed through the proxies along the same
path as the call setup messages.
There are many other protocol interactions supported by
SIP, that cover many common (and uncommon) scenarios
including call forwarding (manual or automatic), conference
calling, voicemail, etc. Typically, this is done by semantically
overloading SIP messages such that they can play various
roles in different parts of the call. We shall see in Section III
examples of how this flexibility and protocol modularity can
be used to attack the system.
All SIP traffic is transmitted over port 5060 (UDP or
TCP). The ports used for the media traffic, however, are
dynamic and negotiated via SDP during call setup. This poses
some problems when Network Address Translation (NAT) or
firewalls are traversed. Typically, these have to be stateful
and understand the SIP exchanges so that they can open the
appropriate RTP ports for the media transfer. In the case of
NAT traversal, endpoints may use protocols like STUN to
enable communication. Alternatively, the Universal Plug-and-
Play (uPnP) protocol 2 may be used in some environments,
such as residential broadband networks consisting of a single
subnet behind a NAT gateway.
Authentication between endpoints, the registrar and the
proxy typically uses HTTP Digest Authentication, as shown
in Figure 3. This is a simple challenge-response protocol that
uses a shared secret key along with a username, domain name,
a nonce, and specific fields from the SIP message to compute
a cryptographic hash. Using this mechanism, passwords are
not transmitted in plaintext form over the network. It is worth
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Fig. 4. Unlicensed Mobile Access (UMA) conceptual architecture
during a call setup. We shall later see an example where this
can be abused by a malicious party to conduct toll fraud in
some environments.
For more complex authentication scenarios, SIP can use
S/MIME encapsulation [24] to carry complex payloads, in-
cluding public keys and certificates. When TCP is used as the
transport protocol for SIP, TLS can be used to protect the SIP
messages. TLS is required for communication among proxies,
registrars and redirect servers, but only recommended between
endpoints and proxies or registrars. Alternatively, IPsec [25]
may be used to protect all communications, regardless of
the transport protocol. However, because few implementations
integrate SIP, RTP and IPsec, it is left to system administrators
to figure out how to setup and manage such configurations.
B. Unlicensed Mobile Access
UMA is a 3GPP standard for enabling transparent access
to mobile circuit-switched voice networks, packet-switch data
networks and IMS services using any IP-based substrate.
Handsets supporting UMA can roam between the operator’s
wireless network (usually referred to as a Radio Access
Network, or RAN) and the Internet without losing access. For
example, a call that is initiated over the RAN can then be
routed, without being dropped and with no user intervention,
over the public Internet if conditions are more favorable
(e.g., stronger WiFi signal in the user’s premises, or in a
hotel wireless hotspot while traveling abroad). For consumers,
UMA offers better connectivity and the possibility of lower
cost by enabling new business models and reducing roaming
charges (under some scenarios). For operators, UMA reduces
the need for additional spectrum, cellphone towers and related
equipment. A variety of cellphones supporting UMA over
WiFi currently exist, along with home gateways and USB-stick
softphones. More recently, some operators have introduced
femtocells (ultra-low power RAN cells intended for consumer-
directed deployment) that can act as UMA gateways, allowing
any mobile handset to take advantage of UMA where such
devices are deployed.
The basic approach behind UMA is to encapsulate complete
GSM and 3G radio frames (except for the over-the-air crypto)
inside IP packets. These can then be transmitted over any IP
network, including the Internet. This means that the mobile
operator can continue to use the existing back-end equipment;
all that is needed is a gateway that decapsulates the GSM/3G
frames and injects them to the existing circuit-switched net-
work (for voice calls), as can be seen in Figure 4.
To protect both signaling and media traffic confidentiality
and integrity while traversing untrusted (and untrustworthy)
networks, UMA uses IPsec. All traffic between the handset
(or, more generally, UMA endpoint) and the provider’s UMA
Network Controller (or a firewall/VPN concentrator screening
traffic) is encrypted and integrity-protected using ESP [26].
The use of IPsec provides a high level of security for the
traffic, once keys and other parameters have been negotiated.
For that purpose, the IKEv2 key management protocol [27]
is used. Authentication uses the EAP-SIM [28] (for GSM
handsets) and EAP-AKA [29] (for UMTS handsets) profiles.
Authentication is asymmetric: the provider authenticates to the
handset using digital signatures and public key certificates,
while the handset authenticates using a SIM-embedded secret
key. It is worth pointing out that UMA provides stronger
authentication guarantees than the baseline cellphone network,
in that the provider does not authenticate to the handset in a
RAN. Furthermore, the cryptographic algorithms used in IPsec
(AES and 3DES) are considered significantly stronger than the
on-the-air algorithms used in GSM.
Despite the use of strong cryptography and sound protocols,
UMA introduces some new risks in the operator networks,
since these now have to be connected to the public Internet in a
much more intimate fashion. In particular, the security gateway
must process IPsec traffic, including the relatively complex
IKEv2 protocol, and a number of UMA-related discovery and
configuration protocols. These increase the attack surface and
overall security exposure of the operators significantly.
C. Other VoIP/IMS Systems
H.323 is an ITU-defined protocol family for VoIP (audio
and video) over packet-switched data networks. The various
subprotocols are encoded in ASN.1 format. In the H.323
world, the main entities are terminals (software or physical
phones), a gateway, a gatekeeper and a back-end service. The
gatekeeper is responsible for address resolution, controlling
bandwidth use and other management functions, while the
gateway connects the H.323 network with other networks (e.g.,
PSTN, or a SIP network). The back-end service maintains
data about the terminals, including configuration, access and
billing rights, etc. An optional multipoint control unit may
also exist to enable multipoint communications, such as a
teleconference. To setup a H.323 call, terminals first interact
with the gatekeeper using the H.225 protocol over either TCP
or UDP to receive authorization and perform address resolu-
tion. Using the same protocol, they then establish the end-
to-end connection to the remote terminal (possibly through
one or more gateways). At that point, H.245 over TCP is
used to negotiate the parameters for the actual media transfer,
including ports, which uses RTP (as in the case of SIP). A
number of other protocols within the H.323 framework cov-
ering security, interoperability with PSTN, teleconferencing,
and others. Authentication may be requested at several steps
during call setup, and typically depends on symmetric keys
but may also use digital signatures. Voice encryption is also
supported through SRTP and MIKEY [30]. Unlike SIP, H.323
does not use a well-known port, making firewall traversal even
more complicated.
Skype3 is a peer-to-peer VoIP system that was originally
available as a softphone for desktop computers but has since
been integrated into cellphones and other handheld devices,
either as an add-on or as the exclusive communication mech-
anism. It offers voice, video, and text messaging to all other
Skype users free of charge, and provides bridging (typically
for a fee) to the PSTN both for outgoing and incoming
calls and text messages (SMS). The underlying protocol is
proprietary, and the software itself incorporates several anti-
reverse engineering techniques. Nonetheless, some analysis
[31], [32] and reverse engineering [33] have taken place,
indicating both the ubiquitous use of strong cryptography and
the presence of some software bugs (at the time of the work).
The system uses a centralized login server but is otherwise
fully distributed with respect to intra-Skype communications.
A number of chat (IM) networks, such as the AOL Instant
Messenger, Microsoft’s Live Messenger, Yahoo! Messenger,
and Google Talk offer voice and video capabilities as well.
Although each network uses its own (often proprietary) pro-
tocol, there exist bridges between most of them, allowing
inter-IM communication at the text level. In most of these
networks, users can place outgoing voice calls to the PSTN.
Some popular IM clients also integrate SIP support.
III. VOIP THREATS
In trying to understand the threat space against VoIP, our
approach is to place known vulnerabilities within a structured
framework. While a single taxonomy is not likely to be
definitive, using several different viewpoints and mapping the
vulnerability space along several axis may reveal trends and
areas that merit further analysis.
As a starting point, we use the taxonomy provided by
the Voice over IP Security Alliance (VoIPSA)4. VoIPSA is a
vendor-neutral, not for profit organization composed of VoIP
and security vendors, organizations and individuals with an
interest in securing VoIP protocols, products and installations.
In addition, we place the surveyed vulnerabilities within the
traditional threat space of confidentiality, integrity, availability
(CIA). Finally, we consider whether the vulnerabilities exploit
bugs in the protocol, implementation or system configuration.
In future work, we hope to expand the number of views to the
surveyed vulnerabilities and to provide more in-depth analysis.
The VoIPSA security threat taxonomy [34] aims to define
the security threats against VoIP deployments, services, and
end users. The key elements of this taxonomy are:
3http://www.skype.com/
4http://www.voipsa.org/
1) Social threats are aimed directly against humans. For
example, misconfigurations, bugs or bad protocol inter-
actions in VoIP systems may enable or facilitate attacks
that misrepresent the identity of malicious parties to
users. Such attacks may then act as stepping stones
to further attacks such as phishing, theft of service, or
unwanted contact (spam).
2) Eavesdropping, interception, and modification
threats cover situations where an adversary can
unlawfully and without authorization from the parties
concerned listen in on the signaling (call setup) or the
content of a VoIP session, and possibly modify aspects
of that session while avoiding detection. Examples of
such attacks include call re-routing and interception of
unencrypted RTP sessions.
3) Denial of service threats have the potential to deny
users access to VoIP services. This may be particularly
problematic in the case of emergencies, or when a
DoS attack affects all of a user’s or organization’s
communication capabilities (i.e., when all VoIP and data
communications are multiplexed over the same network
which can be targeted through a DoS attack). Such
attacks may be VoIP-specific (exploiting flaws in the
call setup or the implementation of services), or VoIP-
agnostic (e.g., generic traffic flooding attacks). They
may also involve attacks with physical components (e.g.,
physically disconnecting or severing a cable) or through
computing or other infrastructures (e.g., disabling the
DNS server, or shutting down power).
4) Service abuse threats covers the improper use of VoIP
services, especially (but not exclusively) in those situa-
tions where such services are offered in a commercial
setting. Examples of such threats include toll fraud and
billing avoidance [35], [36].
5) Physical access threats refer to inappropri-
ate/unauthorized physical access to VoIP equipment, or
to the physical layer of the network (following the ISO
7-layer network stack model).
6) Interruption of services threats refer to non-intentional
problems that may nonetheless cause VoIP services to
become unusable or inaccessible. Examples of such
threats include loss of power due to inclement weather,
resource exhaustion due to over-subscription, and per-
formance issues that degrade call quality.
In our discussion of vulnerabilities (whether theoretical or
demonstrated) that follows, we shall mark each item with a
tuple (V, T, K), where:
• V ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, where each number refers to an
element in the VoIPSA threat taxonomy from above
• T ∈ {C1, I1, A1}, referring to Confidentiality, Integrity
and Availability respectively
• K ∈ {P2, I2, C2}, referring to Protocol, Implementation
and Configuration respectively
For example, an item marked as (1, C1, C2) refers to a
vulnerability that targets the user (Social threat), violating
Confidentiality via a Configuration problem or bug. In some
cases, the same underlying vulnerability may be used to
perform different types of attacks. We will be discussing all
such significant attack variants.
A. Disclosed Vulnerabilities
Threats against VoIP system availability by exploiting im-
plementation weaknesses are fairly common. For example,
some implementations where shown to be vulnerable to
crashes or hanging (livelock) when given empty, malformed,
or large volumes of [37]–[150] INVITE or other messages
(3, A1, I2). It is worth noting that the same vulnerability may
be present across similar protocols on the same platform
and product [44] due to code sharing and internal software
structure, or to systems that need to understand VoIP protocols
but are not nominally part of a VoIP system [151]. The
reason for the disproportionately large number of denial of
service vulnerabilities is because of the ease with which such
failure can be diagnosed, especially when the bug is discovered
through automated testing tools (e.g., fuzzers). Many of these
vulnerabilities may in fact be more serious than a simple denial
of service due to a crash, and could possibly lead to remote
code injection and execution.
Unexpected interactions between different technologies
used in VoIP systems can also lead to vulnerabilities. For
example, in some cases cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks were
demonstrated against the administrator- and customer-facing
management interface (which was web-based) by injecting
malicious Javascript in selected SIP messages [152]–[159]
(1, I1, I2), often through SQL injection vulnerabilities [160],
[161]. The same vulnerability could also be used to commit
toll fraud by targeting the underlying database (4, I1, I2). XSS
attacks that are not web-oriented have also been demonstrated,
with one of the oldest VoIP-related vulnerabilities [162] per-
mitting shell command execution (1, I1, I2). Another web-
oriented attack vector is Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF),
whereby users visiting a malicious page can be induced to
automatically (without user intervention, and often without
any observable indications) perform some action on the web
servers (in this case, VoIP web-based management interface)
that their browser is already authenticated to [163] (1, I1, I2).
Other privilege-escalation vulnerabilities through the web in-
terface also exist [164] (1, I1, I2).
The complexity of the SIP finite state machine has some-
times led to poor implementations. For example, one vulner-
ability [165] allowed attackers to confuse a phone receiving
a call into silently completing the call, which allowed the ad-
versary to eavesdrop on the device’s surroundings (2, C1, I2).
The same vulnerability could be used to deny call reception
at the target, since the device was already marked as busy
(3, A1, I2). In other cases, it is unclear to developers what use
of a specific protocol field may be, in which case they may
silently ignore it. Occasionally, such information is critical for
the security of the protocol exchange, and omitting or not
checking it allows adversaries to perform attacks such man-
in-the-middle or traffic interception [166] (2, C1 + I1, I2), or
to bypass authentication checks [167], [168] (4, I1, I2).
Since SIP devices are primarily software-driven, they are
vulnerable to the same classes of vulnerabilities as other soft-
ware. For example, buffer overflows are possible even against
SIP “hardphones”, much less softphones, allowing adversaries
to gain complete control of the device [40], [64], [65], [169]–
[191] (2, I1, I2). Such vulnerabilities typically arise from a
combination of poor (non-defensive) programming practices,
insufficient testing, and the use of languages, such as C
and C++ that support unsafe operations. Sometimes, these
vulnerabilities appear in software that is not directly used
in VoIP but must be VoIP-aware, e.g., firewalls [192] or
protocol analyzers [193] (2, I1, I2). It is also worth noting
that these are not the only types of vulnerabilities that can
lead to remote code execution [59], [194]–[198]. Other input
validation failures can allow attackers to download arbitrary
files from a user’s machine (1, C1, I2) or to place calls [199]
(1, I1, I2) by supplying specially encoded URIs [200] or other
parameters.
A significant risk with VoIP devices is the ability of
adversaries to misrepresent their identity (e.g., their calling
number). Such vulnerabilities [201] sometimes arise due to
the lack of cross-checking of information provided across
several messages during call setup and throughout the session
(1, I1, I2).
Similar failures to cross-check and validate information
can lead to other attacks, such as indicating whether there
is pending voicemail for the user [202] (1, I1, I2), or where
attackers may spoof incoming calls by directly connecting to
a VoIP phone [203]–[205] (1, I1, I2).
Undocumented, on-by-default features are another source
of vulnerabilities. These are often remnants from testing and
debugging during development that were not disabled when
a product shipped [206]–[210]. As a result, they often offer
privileged access to services and data on a device that would
not be otherwise available [211]–[216] (1, C1, I2). One par-
ticularly interesting vulnerability allowed an attacker to place
outgoing calls through the web management interface [217],
[218] (4, I1, C2).
A significant class of vulnerabilities in VoIP devices re-
volves around default configurations, and in particular default
usernames and passwords [216], [219]–[228] (2, C1 +I1, C2).
Lists of default accounts are easy to find on the Internet via
a search engine. Users often do not change these settings;
ironically, this seems to be particularly so for administrative
accounts, which are rarely (if ever) used in the home/SOHO
environment. Other default settings involve NTP servers [229]
and DNS servers [230] (2, C1 + I1, C2).
Call interception vulnerabilities are a big concern with VoIP
systems, given the plethora of tools for decoding video and
audio streams and the ease of eavesdropping network traffic,
especially on the local subnet. Sometimes, such vulnerabilities
arise from strange protocol interactions and implementation
decisions. For example, caching the location (address) of
a VoIP phone based on the IP address used during boot
time (using TFTP) seems a reasonable approach; however,
since the boot and VoIP stacks are not necessarily tightly
integrated, interaction with one protocol can have adverse
effects (e.g., changing the perceived location of the phone)
in the other protocol [231] (2, C1, I2). Other instances of
such vulnerabilities involve improper/insufficient credential
checking by the registrar or proxy [232] or by the SNMP
server [233], which can lead to traffic interception (2, C1, I2)
and user impersonation (1, I1, I2).
The integration of several capabilities in VoIP products,
e.g., a web server used for the management interface, can
lead to vulnerabilities being imported to the VoIP environment
that would not otherwise apply. In the specific example of
an integrated web server, directory traversal bugs [234] or
similar problems (such as lack of proper authentication in
the web interface) [235], [236] can allow adversaries to read
arbitrary files or other information from the device (1, C1, I2).
SIP (or, more generally, VoIP) components integrated with
firewalls may also interact in undesirable ways. For example,
improper handling of registration requests may allow attackers
to receive messages intended for other users [237] (2, C1, I2).
Other such examples include failure to authenticate server
certificates in wireless environments, enabling man-in-the-
middle and eavesdropping attacks [238], [239] (2, C1, I2).
Predictability and lack of proper use (or sources) of ran-
domness is another vulnerability seen in VoIP products. For
example, predictable values in SIP header messages [240]
allows malicious users to avoid registering but continue using
the service (4, I1, I2).
Protocol responses to carefully crafted messages can reveal
information about the system or its users to an attacker.
Although this has been long understood in limited-domain pro-
tocols (e.g., remote login), with measures taken to normalize
responses such that no information is leaked, the complexity
of VoIP (and other) protocols make this infeasible. As a
result, information disclosure vulnerabilities abound [241],
[242] (1, C1, I2).
Some of the most serious non-implementation type of vul-
nerabilities are those where the specification permits behavior
that is exploitable. For example, certain vendors permit the
actual URI in a SIP INVITE call and the URI used as part
of the Digest Authentication to differ, which (while arguably
permitted by the specification) allows credential reuse and toll
fraud [243], [244] (4, I1, P2).
While rare, protocol-level vulnerabilities also exist. These
represent either outright bugs in the specification, or un-
foreseen interaction between different protocols or protocol
components. For large, complicated protocols such as SIP
and H.323, where components (code, messages, etc.) are se-
mantically overloaded and reused, it is perhaps not surprising
that such emergent properties exist. One good example is the
relay attack possible with the SIP Digest Authentication [245],
whereby an adversary can reuse another party’s credentials to
obtain unauthorized access to SIP or PSTN services (such as
calling a premium or international phone line) (4, I1, P2). This
attack, depicted in Figure 5, is possible because authentication
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Fig. 5. SIP relay attack
time during a call, and the responder may issue an INVITE
message during a call either automatically (because of timer
expirations) or through a user action (e.g., placing the caller
on hold in order to do a call transfer).
IV. DISCUSSION
Looking at the vulnerabilities we have considered, a few
patterns emerge. First, as we can see in our informal classi-
fication of vulnerability effects show in Figure 6, half of the
problems lead to a denial of service in either an end-device
(phone, softphone) or a server (proxy, registrar, etc.). This is
not altogether surprising, since denial of service (especially a
crash) is something that is easily diagnosed. In many cases, the
problem was discovered by automated testing, such as protocol
or software fuzzing; software failures are relatively easy to
determine in such settings. Some of these vulnerabilities could
in fact turn out to be more serious, e.g., a memory corruption
leading to a crash could be exploitable to mount a code
injection attack. The second largest class of vulnerabilities
allows an adversary to control the device, whether by code
injection, default passwords and services, or authentication
failures. Note that we counted a few of the vulnerabilities
(approximately 10%) more than once in this classification.
The same pattern with respect to the predominance of denial
of service vulnerabilities holds when we look at the breakdown
according to the VoIPSA taxonomy, shown in Figure 7. It
should not be surprising that, given the nature of the vul-
nerabilities disclosed in CVE, we have no data on physical
access and (accidental) interruption of services vulnerabilities.
Furthermore, while “Access to Services” was a non-negligible
component in the previous breakdown, it represents only 4%
here. The reason for this apparent discrepancy is in the differ-
ent definitions of service: the specific element in the VoIPSA
taxonomy refers to VoIP-specific abuse, whereas our informal
definition covers lower-level system components which may
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Fig. 6. Vulnerability breakdown based on effect. Most categories are self-
explanatory; “attack the user” refers to vulnerabilities that permit attackers to
affect the user/administrator of a device, without necessarily compromising
the system or getting access to its data or services. XSS attacks and traffic
eavesdropping attacks fall in this category, whereas attacks that compromise
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Fig. 7. Vulnerability breakdown based on VoIPSA taxonomy
other observation here is that, while the VoIPSA taxonomy
covers a broad spectrum of concerns for VoIP system designers
and operators, its categories are too perhaps too broad (and, in
some cases, imprecise) to help with characterizing the types
of bugs we have examined.
The vulnerability breakdown according to the traditional
(Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability) security concerns again
reflects the predominance of denial of service threats against
VoIP systems, as seen in Figure 8. However, we can see that
Integrity violations (e.g., system compromise) are a sizable
component of the threat space, while Confidentiality violations
are seen in only 15% of disclosed vulnerabilities. This repre-





Fig. 8. Vulnerability breakdown based on “traditional” security classification
(C1, I1, A1)
istrators, who (anecdotal evidence suggests) typically worry
about such issues as call interception and eavesdropping.
Finally, Figure 9 shows the breakdown based on source of
vulnerability. The overwhelming majority of reported prob-
lems arise from implementation issues, which should not
be surprising given the nature of bug disclosure. Problems
arising from configuration represented 7% of the total space,
including such items as privileged services left on and default
username/passwords. However, note that the true picture (i.e.,
what actually happens with deployed systems) is probably
different in that configuration problems are most likely un-
dercounted: such problems are often site-specific and are not
reported to bug-disclosure databases when discovered. On
the other hand, implementation and protocol problems are
prime candidates for disclosure. What is surprising is the
presence of protocol vulnerabilities; one would expect that
such problems were discovered and issued during protocol
development, specification, and standardization. Their mere
existence potentially indicates high protocol complexity.
The vulnerability analysis contained in this paper is, by
its nature, static: we have presented a snapshot of known
problems with VoIP systems, with no correlation with (and
knowledge of) actual attacks exploiting these, or other vulner-
abilities. A complete analysis of the threat space would also
contain a dynamic component, whereby attacker behavior pat-
terns and trends would be analyzed vis-a-vis actual, deployed
VoIP systems or, lacking access to such, simulacra thereof
[246].
V. CONCLUSIONS
We can draw some preliminary conclusions with respect to
threats and focus areas for future research based on the data
examined so far. These can be summarized as follows:
1) The large majority of disclosed threats focused on denial
of services attacks based on implementation issues.
While fault-tolerance techniques can be applied in the





Fig. 9. Vulnerability breakdown based on source (I2, C2, P2)
tolerance, etc.), it is less clear how to provide similar
levels of protection at acceptable cost and usability to
end user devices. Unfortunately, the easy with which
mass DoS attacks can be launched over the network
against client devices means that they represent an
attractive venue for attackers to achieve the same impact.
2) Code injection attacks in their various forms (buffer
overflow, cross-site scripting, SQL injection, etc.) remain
a problem. While a number of techniques have been
developed, we need to do a better job at deploying and
using them where possible, and devising new techniques
suitable for the constrained environments that some
vulnerable VoIP devices represent.
3) Weak default configurations remain a problem, as they
do across a large class of consumer and enterprise
products and software. The situation is likely to be much
worse in the real world, considering the complexity of
securely configuring a system with as many components
as VoIP. Vendors must make an effort to provide secure-
by-default configurations, and to educate users how best
to protect their systems. Administrators are in need
of tools to analyze their existing configurations for
vulnerabilities. While some tools that dynamically test
network components (e.g., firewalls), we need tools that
work higher in the protocol and application stack (i.e.,
interacting at the user level). Furthermore, we need ways
of validating configurations across multiple components
and protocols.
4) Finally, there is simply no excuse for protocol-level
vulnerabilities. While there exist techniques for ana-
lyzing and verifying security protocols, they do not
seem to cope well with complexity. Aside from using
such tools and continuing their development, protocol
designers and standardization committees must consider
the impact of their decisions on system implementers,
i.e., whether it is likely that a feature or aspect of
the protocol is likely to be misunderstood and/or mis-
implemented. Simpler protocols are also desirable, but
seem incompatible with the trends we have observed in
standardization bodies.
Our plans for future work include expanding the data set we
used for our analysis to include findings from academic work,
adding and presenting more views (classifications) to the data,
and developing dynamic views to VoIP-related misbehavior.
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